

DU MPhil Phd in Sociology

Topic:- SOCIO_Q1_Q4

1) Thatcherism's project was to transform the state in order to restructure society: to decentre, to displace, the whole post-war formation; to reverse the political culture which had formed the basis of the political settlement – the historic compromise between labour and capital – which had been in place from 1945 onwards.

The depth of the reversal aimed for was profound: a reversal of the ground- rules of that settlement, of the social alliances which underpinned it and the values which made it popular. I don't mean the attitudes and values of the people who write books. I mean the ideas of the people who simply, in ordinary everyday life, have to calculate how to survive, how to look after those who are closest to them.

That is what is meant by saying that Thatcherism aimed for a reversal in ordinary common sense. The 'common sense' of the English people had been constructed around the notion that the last war had erected a barrier between the bad old days of the 1930s and now: the welfare state had come to stay; we'd never go back to using the criterion of the market as a measure of people's needs, the needs of society. There would always have to be some additional, incremental, institutional force – the state, representing the general interest of society – to bring to bear against, to modify, the market. I'm perfectly well aware that socialism was not inaugurated in 1945. I'm talking about the taken- for-granted, popular base of welfare social democracy, which formed the real, concrete ground on which any socialism worth the name has to be built. Thatcherism was a project to engage, to contest, that project, and, wherever possible, to dismantle it, and to put something new in place. It entered the political field in an historic contest, not just for power, but for popular authority, for hegemony.

It is a project – this confuses the Left no end – which is, simultaneously, regressive and progressive. Regressive because, in certain crucial respects, it takes us backwards. ... It's deeply regressive, ancient and archaic.

But don't misunderstand it. It's also a project of 'modernisation'. It is a form of *regressive modernisation*. Because, at the same time, Thatcherism had its beady eye fixed on one of the most profound historical facts about the British social formation: that it never ever properly entered the era of modern bourgeois civilisation. It never made that transfer to modernity. It never institutionalised, in a proper sense, the civilisation and structures of advanced capitalism – what Gramsci called 'Fordism'. It never transformed its old industrial and political structures. Consequently, Mrs.

Thatcher knows that there is no serious political project in Britain today which is not also about constructing a politics and an image of what *modernity* would be like for our people. And Thatcherism, in its regressive way, drawing on the past, looking backwards to former glories rather than forwards to a new epoch, has inaugurated the project of reactionary modernisation.

Choose the best option among the answer options given for the question below.

The Thatcherite project was aimed at:

[Question ID = 11130]

1. Transforming the common sense of the British people.

[Option ID = 44517]

2. Transforming the nature of the state.

[Option ID = 44518]

3. Transforming common sense around the role of the state.

[Option ID = 44519]

4. Modernising the British state.

[Option ID = 44520]

2) Thatcherism's project was to transform the state in order to restructure society: to decentre, to displace, the whole post-war formation; to reverse the political culture which had formed the basis of the political settlement – the historic compromise between labour and capital – which had been in place from 1945 onwards.

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Choose the best option among the answer options given for the question below.

In this passage, "common sense" means:

[Question ID = 11131]

1. What people get from reading books.

[Option ID = 44521]

2. The values that people hold.

[Option ID = 44522]

3. Ideas of how to get by given a particular political situation.

[Option ID = 44523]

4. Practical knowledge of how to be modern.

[Option ID = 44524]

3) Thatcherism's project was to transform the state in order to restructure society: to decentre, to displace, the whole post-war formation; to reverse the political culture which had formed the basis of the political settlement — the historic compromise between labour and capital — which had been in place from 1945 onwards.

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Choose the best option among the answer options given for the question below.

Hegemony in this formulation means:

[Question ID = 11132]

1. An authoritative establishment of what is common sense.

[Option ID = 44525]

2. Domination over the state.

[Option ID = 44526]

3. A form of modernisation that is both regressive and progressive.

[Option ID = 44527]

4. Defeating the socialist project.

[Option ID = 44528]

4) Thatcherism's project was to transform the state in order to restructure society: to decentre, to displace, the whole post-war formation; to reverse the political culture which had formed the basis of the political settlement — the historic compromise between labour and capital — which had been in place from 1945 onwards.

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Choose the best option among the answer options given for the questions below.

The passage suggests that Thatcherism is a modernist project because:

[Question ID = 11133]

1. It is a new-old form of Victorian values.

[Option ID = 44529]

2. Britain was never fully industrialised.

[Option ID = 44530]

3. While destroying the welfare state, it presented a self-image to the British of how to be modern.

[Option ID = 44531]

4. Margaret Thatcher was a modernising Prime Minister.

[Option ID = 44532]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q5_Q8

1) In hegemonic discourse, it is generally assumed that the larger a farm enterprise, the better it is. Agricultural policies actively support scale-enlargement. They do so through a range of instruments that not only include price-support, subsidies and fiscal benefits, but also environmental policies, spatial planning and support mechanisms for technological R&D that are all tuned to the needs and dynamics of large farms. The same applies for provisioning industries. Since large farms (due to their specific technological profile) proportionally acquire more inputs (and more sophisticated means of production), provisioning industries give a considerable discount to large farms, thus stimulating farm growth. Banks are also more favourable to large farms. Food processing industries (and large trading companies) also channel benefits towards large farms. Since dealing with the latter brings lower transactions costs, they offer extra premiums for large volumes of production (in this respect agribusiness operates as a mechanism of redistribution from many small farms to a small group of large farms). Thus, the large farm seems to coincide with the notion of superiority - materially as well as symbolically. In times of turmoil, however, it is the other way around. Then the sheer magnitude of the farm suddenly appears to be a considerable disadvantage. Having a large farm means having high fixed costs that prohibit far-reaching adaptations in the organization of production. It also implies that volumes of production are far too large to be able to provision local and regional markets. The 'world market' remains indispensable - the more so since production is highly specialized (limited to one or two products). The magnitude of the farm (in combination with the high levels of fixed costs and debts) also implies that organizing the 'reset' in phases (starting with limited volumes and then a step-by-step growth in order to explore the new market situation) is unthinkable. In the case of fruit and vegetables, the restart of large farms implies a sudden recourse to migrant workers. It is open to question whether they will be willing to come back. In short, the agility needed for reconstruction in the post-pandemic era is lacking among large, entrepreneurial farms. They will stumble over their own size.

This passage is primarily a critique of:[Question ID = 11134]

1. The low productivity of small farms. [Option ID = 44533]

2. The manner in which agricultural policies support large farms. [Option ID = 44534]

3. The superiority of large-scale commercial agriculture. [Option ID = 44535]

4. The limitations of small farms during pandemics. [Option ID = 44536]

2) In hegemonic discourse, it is generally assumed that the larger a farm enterprise, the better it is. Agricultural policies actively support scale-enlargement. They do so through a range of instruments that not only include price-support, subsidies and fiscal benefits, but also environmental policies, spatial planning and support mechanisms for technological R&D that are all tuned to the needs and dynamics of large farms. The same applies for provisioning industries. Since large farms (due to their specific technological profile) proportionally acquire more inputs (and more sophisticated means of production), provisioning industries give a considerable discount to large farms, thus stimulating farm growth. Banks are also more favourable to large farms. Food processing industries (and large trading companies) also channel benefits towards large farms. Since dealing with the latter brings lower transactions costs, they offer extra premiums for large volumes of production (in this respect agribusiness operates as a mechanism of redistribution from many small farms to a small group of large farms). Thus, the large farm seems to coincide with the notion of superiority - materially as well as symbolically. In times of turmoil, however, it is the other way around. Then the sheer magnitude of the farm suddenly appears to be a considerable disadvantage. Having a large farm means having high fixed costs that prohibit far-reaching adaptations in the organization of production. It also implies that volumes of production are far too large to be able to provision local and regional markets. The 'world market' remains indispensable - the more so since production is highly specialized (limited to one or two products). The magnitude of the farm (in combination with the high levels of fixed costs and debts) also implies that organizing the 'reset' in phases (starting with limited volumes and then a step-by-step growth in order to explore the new market situation) is unthinkable. In the case of fruit and vegetables, the restart of large farms implies a sudden recourse to migrant workers. It is open to question whether they will be willing to come back. In short, the agility needed for reconstruction in the post-pandemic era is lacking among large, entrepreneurial farms. They will stumble over their own size.

The passage suggests that global markets support large farms through mechanisms like:[Question ID = 11135]

1. Minimum support prices. [Option ID = 44537]
2. Channelling of credit and bulk purchases. [Option ID = 44538]
3. Environmental policies and spatial planning. [Option ID = 44539]
4. Supply of global migrant labour. [Option ID = 44540]

3) In hegemonic discourse, it is generally assumed that the larger a farm enterprise, the better it is. Agricultural policies actively support scale-enlargement. They do so through a range of instruments that not only include price-support, subsidies and fiscal benefits, but also environmental policies, spatial planning and support mechanisms for technological R&D that are all tuned to the needs and dynamics of large farms. The same applies for provisioning industries. Since large farms (due to their specific technological profile) proportionally acquire more inputs (and more sophisticated means of production), provisioning industries give a considerable discount to large farms, thus stimulating farm growth. Banks are also more favourable to large farms. Food processing industries (and large trading companies) also channel benefits towards large farms. Since dealing with the latter brings lower transactions costs, they offer extra premiums for large volumes of production (in this respect agribusiness operates as a mechanism of redistribution from many small farms to a small group of large farms). Thus, the large farm seems to coincide with the notion of superiority - materially as well as symbolically. In times of turmoil, however, it is the other way around. Then the sheer magnitude of the farm suddenly appears to be a considerable disadvantage. Having a large farm means having high fixed costs that prohibit far-reaching adaptations in the organization of production. It also implies that volumes of production are far too large to be able to provision local and regional markets. The 'world market' remains indispensable - the more so since production is highly specialized (limited to one or two products). The magnitude of the farm (in combination with the high levels of fixed costs and debts) also implies that organizing the 'reset' in phases (starting with limited volumes and then a step-by-step growth in order to explore the new market situation) is unthinkable. In the case of fruit and vegetables, the restart of large farms implies a sudden recourse to migrant workers. It is open to question whether they will be willing to come back. In short, the agility needed for reconstruction in the post-pandemic era is lacking among large, entrepreneurial farms. They will stumble over their own size.

Large farms "stumble over their own size" in pandemic situations because of:[Question ID = 11136]

1. Variable and therefore unpredictable costs and debts. [Option ID = 44541]
2. Fixed costs, inability to adjust volumes or adjust to revised labour needs. [Option ID = 44542]
3. Preference for local rather than migrant labour. [Option ID = 44543]
4. Lack of entrepreneurship in adjusting to new markets. [Option ID = 44544]

4) In hegemonic discourse, it is generally assumed that the larger a farm enterprise, the better it is. Agricultural policies actively support scale-enlargement. They do so through a range of instruments that not only include price-support, subsidies and fiscal benefits, but also environmental policies, spatial planning and support mechanisms for technological R&D that are all tuned to the needs and dynamics of large farms. The same applies for provisioning industries. Since large farms (due to their specific technological profile) proportionally acquire more inputs (and more sophisticated means of production), provisioning industries give a considerable discount to large farms, thus stimulating farm growth. Banks are also more favourable to large farms. Food processing industries (and large trading companies) also channel benefits towards large farms. Since dealing with the latter brings lower transactions costs, they offer extra premiums for large volumes of production (in this respect agribusiness operates as a mechanism of redistribution from many small farms to a small group of large farms). Thus, the large farm seems to coincide with the notion of superiority - materially as well as symbolically. In times of turmoil, however, it is the other way around. Then the sheer magnitude of the farm suddenly appears to be a considerable disadvantage. Having a large farm means having high fixed costs that prohibit far-reaching adaptations in the organization of production. It also implies that volumes of production are far too large to be able to provision local and regional markets. The 'world market' remains indispensable - the more so since production is highly specialized (limited to one or two products). The magnitude of the farm (in combination with the high levels of fixed costs and debts) also implies

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“Agribusiness operates as a mechanism of redistribution from many small farms to a small group of large farms” because:
[Question ID = 11137]

1. Government policies favour large farms. [Option ID = 44545]
2. Large farms are materially and symbolically superior to small farms. [Option ID = 44546]
3. Agribusinesses prefer to supply inputs and buy produce on a large scale. [Option ID = 44547]
4. Large farms have higher fixed costs than small farms. [Option ID = 44548]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q9_Q12

1) The ambition of anthropological thought—to think humankind in its unicity and variation— has historically placed anthropologists in the midst of cosmopolitan ideologies and utopias. It is difficult to know whether people are attracted to anthropology because they are cosmopolitans or whether abstract notions such as culture(s), society, kinship, and humankind turn them into cosmopolitans. Hannerz (1996) posits that a true interest in and engagement with alterity are at the core of cosmopolitanism. Among Western academic disciplines, anthropology is defined by a wanting to understand the structures of alterity. Fabian (2012) reaffirms this disciplinary singularity, sees alterity as a theoretical concept that was useful to criticize “ideological views of cultural differences,” and reasserts its essential epistemological role as the unifying issue of the discipline regardless of where anthropologists are located, in the West or elsewhere. In sum, cosmopolitanism, alterity, and anthropology go hand in hand.

Going to faraway lands has played a central role in the discipline’s constitution and consolidation, especially after ethnography, in the first half of the twentieth century, became one of its central tenets. [...] Indeed, since the nineteenth century, and more so in the past 30 years when the discipline increasingly globalized itself, anthropologists have woven innumerable transnational webs of scholarly exchange and influence. Anthropological cosmopolitanisms are sometimes set in motion, and anthropologists attempt to deploy their international agency. International conferences, for instance, are opportunities to connect with colleagues from other countries and to set international agendas. They have been organized in the nineteenth century as exemplified by the International Congress of Anthropology and Prehistoric Archaeology, founded in La Spezia, Italy, in 1865 and by the International Congress of Anthropology held in Chicago in 1894. But only in 1934 was a supranational organization founded: the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (ICAES).

To explore the nature of anthropological cosmopolitanisms I need to emphasize two of their main characteristics. First, the profession is rooted in a worldview based on the respect for human diversity. Second, anthropology calls for agents and agencies that, albeit anchored in national scenarios, sometimes become politically active on a supranational level. I see the interest, academic or otherwise, in the diversity of human life and the international actions of anthropologists as cosmopolitics. For the purposes of this article, I understand cosmopolitics as (a) “discourses and modes of doing politics concerned with their global reach and impact” and (b) discourses that attempt to make sense of human diversity and of alterity. When discussing world anthropologies, I am particularly interested in “cosmopolitics that are embedded in conflicts regarding the role of difference and diversity in the construction of polities. I view anthropology as a cosmopolitics about the structure of alterity that pretends to be universal but that, at the same time, is highly sensitive to its own limitations and to the efficacy of other cosmopolitics.”

“Cosmopolitanism, alterity, and anthropology go hand in hand” because:

[Question ID = 11138]

1. Anthropologists are more cosmopolitan than archaeologists or agricultural scientists who also work in the ‘field’.
[Option ID = 44549]
2. Anthropologists travel to international conferences more than other disciplines.
[Option ID = 44550]
3. Anthropologists have to take into account global diversities and commonalities which is a hallmark of cosmopolitanism.
[Option ID = 44551]
4. Anthropologists are focussed on similarities and alterities between themselves and anthropologists of other countries.
[Option ID = 44552]

2) The ambition of anthropological thought—to think humankind in its unicity and variation— has historically placed anthropologists in the midst of cosmopolitan ideologies and utopias. It is difficult to know whether people are attracted to anthropology because they are cosmopolitans or whether abstract notions such as culture(s), society, kinship, and humankind turn them into cosmopolitans. Hannerz (1996) posits that a true interest in and engagement with alterity are at the core of cosmopolitanism. Among Western academic disciplines, anthropology is defined by a wanting to understand the structures of alterity. Fabian (2012) reaffirms this disciplinary singularity, sees alterity as a theoretical concept that was useful to criticize “ideological views of cultural differences,” and reasserts its essential epistemological role as the unifying issue of the discipline regardless of where anthropologists are located, in the West or elsewhere. In sum, cosmopolitanism, alterity, and anthropology go hand in hand.

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Cosmopolitics may be defined as:

[Question ID = 11139]

1. A form of research and practice that takes into account human commonalities.

[Option ID = 44553]

2. A form of politics that takes into account domestic context.

[Option ID = 44554]

3. A form of research that is concerned with the global implications of politics.

[Option ID = 44555]

4. A form of thinking focused on human diversity and the global impact of politics.

[Option ID = 44556]

3) The ambition of anthropological thought—to think humankind in its unicity and variation— has historically placed anthropologists in the midst of cosmopolitan ideologies and utopias. It is difficult to know whether people are attracted to anthropology because they are cosmopolitans or whether abstract notions such as culture(s), society, kinship, and humankind turn them into cosmopolitans. Hannerz (1996) posits that a true interest in and engagement with alterity are at the core of cosmopolitanism. Among Western academic disciplines, anthropology is defined by a wanting to understand the structures of alterity. Fabian (2012) reaffirms this disciplinary singularity, sees alterity as a theoretical concept that was useful to criticize “ideological views of cultural differences,” and reasserts its essential epistemological role as the unifying issue of the discipline regardless of where anthropologists are located, in the West or elsewhere. In sum, cosmopolitanism, alterity, and anthropology go hand in hand.

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Alterity may be defined as:

[Question ID = 11140]

1. An understanding of the ideas and practices of people from other cultures.

[Option ID = 44557]

2. An understanding that cultures can be altered by colonialism and capitalism.

[Option ID = 44558]

3. A theory that supports “ideological views of cultural differences”.

[Option ID = 44559]

4. A form of culture shock caused by encounters with alien cultures and societies.

[Option ID = 44560]

4) The ambition of anthropological thought—to think humankind in its unicity and variation— has historically placed anthropologists in the midst of cosmopolitan ideologies and utopias. It is difficult to know whether people are attracted to anthropology because they are cosmopolitans or whether abstract notions such as culture(s), society, kinship, and humankind turn them into cosmopolitans. Hannerz (1996) posits that a true interest in and engagement with alterity are at the core of cosmopolitanism. Among Western academic disciplines, anthropology is defined by a wanting to understand the structures of alterity. Fabian (2012) reaffirms this disciplinary singularity, sees alterity as a theoretical concept that was useful to criticize “ideological views of cultural differences,” and reasserts its essential epistemological role as the unifying issue of the discipline regardless of where anthropologists are located, in the West or elsewhere. In sum, cosmopolitanism, alterity, and anthropology go hand in hand.

Going to faraway lands has played a central role in the discipline’s constitution and consolidation, especially after ethnography, in the first half of the twentieth century, became one of its central tenets. [...] Indeed, since the nineteenth century, and more so in the past 30 years when the discipline increasingly globalized itself, anthropologists have woven innumerable transnational webs of scholarly exchange and influence. Anthropological cosmopolitanisms are sometimes set in motion, and anthropologists attempt to deploy their international agency. International conferences, for instance, are opportunities to connect with colleagues from other countries and to set international agendas. They have been organized in the nineteenth century as exemplified by the International Congress of Anthropology and Prehistoric Archaeology, founded in La Spezia, Italy, in 1865 and by the International Congress of Anthropology held in Chicago in 1894. But only in 1934 was a supranational organization founded: the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (ICAES).

To explore the nature of anthropological cosmopolitanisms I need to emphasize two of their main characteristics. First, the profession is rooted in a worldview based on the respect for human diversity. Second, anthropology calls for agents and agencies that, albeit anchored in national scenarios, sometimes become politically active on a supranational level. I see the interest, academic or otherwise, in the diversity of human life and the international actions of anthropologists as cosmopolitics. For the purposes of this article, I understand cosmopolitics as (a) “discourses and modes of doing politics concerned with their global reach and impact” and (b) discourses that attempt to make sense of human diversity and of alterity. When discussing world anthropologies, I am particularly interested in “cosmopolitics that are embedded in conflicts regarding the role of difference and diversity in the construction of polities. I view anthropology as a cosmopolitics about the structure of alterity that pretends to be universal but that, at the same time, is highly sensitive to its own limitations and to the efficacy of other cosmopolitics.”

The practice of anthropological cosmopolitanism as against a mere theorising of it has taken which of the following forms:

[Question ID = 11141]

1. Travel to distant lands to study the ‘natives’ who live there.

[Option ID = 44561]

2. Travel to international conferences to study native anthropologists.

[Option ID = 44562]

3. Anthropologists collaborating to create international research agendas.

[Option ID = 44563]

4. 1 and 3 above.

[Option ID = 44564]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q13_Q16

1) In my use, “communities of fate” refers not to elements of a global civil society but to the network of collectivities that become connected as a result of diverse ethical decisions and feelings associated with technological innovations. Different forms of biotechnology can be used to manipulate corporeal and affective interests that reinforce a sense of community and shared fate, for instance by activating traditional values of family, ethnicity, and the nation in the course of ethical decision making. At another level, political authorities and venture capitalists variously participate in the ethical legitimization of biotech projects as tools that serve the well-being of individuals and society. The bioeconomy is understood not merely as a generator of profits but also as an ethical machine for solving the problems of health, regeneration, bioresponsibility, and biosecurity.

Doctors, engineers, and scientists have always played leading roles in Asian governments. Political diagnosis invariably uses sciences as both metaphor and technique for solving the myriad problems of welfare, growth, and political legitimacy. The role of scientific knowledge in the success of postcolonial nations begets a powerful emotional resonance especially among the educated elite. From India to South Korea, generations of upwardly mobile parents wanted and continue to want their children to become doctors and engineers to help save and strengthen the motherland. Science and patriotism are tightly intertwined. Biotech modernity is thus the latest in a genealogy of scientific methods that have been central for enhancing and ethicalizing state-led modernization.

In politics shaped by the Confucian ethos, citizens expect the paternalistic state to set ethical norms of social well-being and

moral behavior. Modern China has a tradition of mass mobilization campaigns against a variety of political foes, and more recently, for family planning and antismoking campaigns. Singapore is famous as well for its civic campaigns to promote childbirth, marriage rates, and healthy living. Conduct that complies with such stated norms gives ethical visibility to these social goals. Making modern science compelling in its beneficial effects on the population and making healthy living a form of civic virtue are ways of giving visibility to ethical practices that interweave communities of shared fate. Older circles of cultural, ethnic, and civic solidarity offer reinforcements for biotech innovations that raise new ethical questions about relationships between individuals, collectivities, and the nation. These emerging ethical constellations are varied and unevenly integrated across the Asian landscape. There are broad South Asian and East Asian contrasts: in Indian cases, ethical decisions about biomedical procedures tend to operate at the kinship level, whereas in other Asian contexts, individual voluntary decisions tend to take into account broader scales of ethical reasoning in thinking through benefits, risks, and the common good. In this sense, a multitude of micro conducts regarding biotechnologies help to configure new ethical imaginings of shared fate.

The author uses the term “communities of fate” to refer to:

[Question ID = 11142]

1. Local rather than global networks in civil society.

[Option ID = 44565]

2. Communities of doctors, engineers and scientists with leading roles in government.

[Option ID = 44566]

3. All kinds of collectivities linked by moral and emotional responses to technology.

[Option ID = 44567]

4. Communities created by political authorities and venture capitalists.

[Option ID = 44568]

2) In my use, “communities of fate” refers not to elements of a global civil society but to the network of collectivities that become connected as a result of diverse ethical decisions and feelings associated with technological innovations. Different forms of biotechnology can be used to manipulate corporeal and affective interests that reinforce a sense of community and shared fate, for instance by activating traditional values of family, ethnicity, and the nation in the course of ethical decision making. At another level, political authorities and venture capitalists variously participate in the ethical legitimization of biotech projects as tools that serve the well-being of individuals and society. The bioeconomy is understood not merely as a generator of profits but also as an ethical machine for solving the problems of health, regeneration, bioresponsibility, and biosecurity.

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According to the passage, biotech modernity in Asia includes and/or works with:

1. State machineries.
2. Educated elites.
3. Scientific principles and ethical norms.

Emotive solidarities based on patriotism or ethnic belonging.

[Question ID = 11143]

1. i and ii only

[Option ID = 44569]

2. ii and iii only

[Option ID = 44570]

3. i, ii and iii only

[Option ID = 44571]

4. i, ii, iii and iv

[Option ID = 44572]

3) In my use, “communities of fate” refers not to elements of a global civil society but to the network of collectivities that become connected as a result of diverse ethical decisions and feelings associated with technological innovations. Different forms of biotechnology can be used to manipulate corporeal and affective interests that reinforce a sense of community and shared fate, for instance by activating traditional values of family, ethnicity, and the nation in the course of ethical decision making. At another level, political authorities and venture capitalists variously participate in the ethical legitimization of biotech projects as tools that serve the well-being of individuals and society. The bioeconomy is understood not merely as a generator of profits but also as an ethical machine for solving the problems of health, regeneration, bioresponsibility, and biosecurity.

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Which of the following is NOT compatible with ‘communities of fate’?

1. Kinship, community, ethnicity and nationalism.
2. Ethical norms set by a paternalistic state.
3. Healthy living being treated as a form of civic virtue.
4. Individualising the benefits and risks of technology.

[Question ID = 11144]

1. iv only

[Option ID = 44573]

2. i only

[Option ID = 44574]

3. ii only

[Option ID = 44575]

4. iii only

[Option ID = 44576]

4) In my use, “communities of fate” refers not to elements of a global civil society but to the network of collectivities that become connected as a result of diverse ethical decisions and feelings associated with technological innovations. Different forms of biotechnology can be used to manipulate corporeal and affective interests that reinforce a sense of community and shared fate, for instance by activating traditional values of family, ethnicity, and the nation in the course of ethical decision making. At another level, political authorities and venture capitalists variously participate in the ethical legitimization of biotech projects as tools that serve the well-being of individuals and society. The bioeconomy is understood not merely as a generator of profits but also as an ethical machine for solving the problems of health, regeneration, bioresponsibility, and biosecurity.

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How is bioeconomy treated as an ethical value?

1. By generating effective and profitable systems of Asian medicine.
2. By promoting bioresponsibility via science and technological innovation.
3. By activating traditional values of family, ethnicity and nationhood.
4. By working towards a global civil society based on scientific technologies.

[Question ID = 11145]

1. i only

[Option ID = 44577]

2. iii & iv

[Option ID = 44578]

3. ii & iii

[Option ID = 44579]

4. i & iv

[Option ID = 44580]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q17_Q20

1) If capitalism is neither an economic system nor a reified form of ethical life, then what is it? My answer is that it is best conceived as an institutionalized social order, on a par with, for example, feudalism. Understanding capitalism in this way underscores its structural divisions, especially the institutional separations that I have identified. Constitutive of capitalism, we have seen, is the institutional separation of “economic production” from “social reproduction,” a gendered separation that grounds specifically capitalist forms of male domination even as it also enables capitalist exploitation of labor power and, through that, its officially sanctioned mode of accumulation. Also definitive of capitalism is the institutional separation of “economy” from “polity,” a separation that expels matters defined as “economic” from the political agenda of territorial states, freeing capital to roam in a transnational no-man’s-land, where it reaps the benefits of hegemonic ordering while escaping political control. Equally fundamental to capitalism, finally, is the ontological division, pre-existing but massively intensified, between its (nonhuman) “natural” background and its (apparently nonnatural) “human” foreground.

Therefore, to speak of capitalism as an institutionalized social order, premised on such separations, is to suggest its nonaccidental, structural imbrication with gender oppression, political domination—both national and transnational, colonial and postcolonial—and ecological degradation, in conjunction, of course, with its equally structural, nonaccidental foreground dynamic of labor exploitation.

This is not to suggest, however, that capitalism’s institutional divisions are simply given once and for all. On the contrary, as we saw, precisely where and how capitalist societies draw the line between production and reproduction, economy and polity, human and nonhuman nature varies historically, according to the regime of accumulation. In fact, we can conceptualize competitive laissez-faire capitalism, state-managed monopoly capitalism, and globalizing neoliberal capitalism in precisely these terms, as three historically specific ways of demarcating economy from polity, production from reproduction, and human from nonhuman nature.

According to the above passage, capitalism as an institutionalized social order rests on supposed distinctions between:

[Question ID = 11146]

1. Production and reproduction.

[Option ID = 44581]

2. The human and the non-human.

[Option ID = 44582]

3. The economy and the polity.

[Option ID = 44583]

4. All of the above.

[Option ID = 44584]

2) If capitalism is neither an economic system nor a reified form of ethical life, then what is it? My answer is that it is best conceived as an institutionalized social order, on a par with, for example, feudalism. Understanding capitalism in this way

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From the above passage, we can infer that:

[Question ID = 11147]

1. Ecological degradation is an unintended by-product of capitalism.

[Option ID = 44585]

2. Colonialism has an intimate and non-accidental relation with capitalism.

[Option ID = 44586]

3. Gender oppression is quite different from capitalist oppression.

[Option ID = 44587]

4. Capitalism relegates all previous forms of domination to the background.

[Option ID = 44588]

3) If capitalism is neither an economic system nor a reified form of ethical life, then what is it? My answer is that it is best conceived as an institutionalized social order, on a par with, for example, feudalism. Understanding capitalism in this way underscores its structural divisions, especially the institutional separations that I have identified. Constitutive of capitalism, we have seen, is the institutional separation of “economic production” from “social reproduction,” a gendered separation that grounds specifically capitalist forms of male domination even as it also enables capitalist exploitation of labor power and, through that, its officially sanctioned mode of accumulation. Also definitive of capitalism is the institutional separation of “economy” from “polity,” a separation that expels matters defined as “economic” from the political agenda of territorial states, freeing capital to roam in a transnational no-man’s-land, where it reaps the benefits of hegemonic ordering while escaping political control. Equally fundamental to capitalism, finally, is the ontological division, pre-existing but massively intensified, between its (nonhuman) “natural” background and its (apparently nonnatural) “human” foreground.

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Choose the statement which CANNOT be inferred from the above:

[Question ID = 11148]

1. The dividing line between economy and polity need not be the same in State managed monopoly capitalism and globalizing neoliberal capitalism.

[Option ID = 44589]

2. Labour exploitation is not the only form of exploitative relationship characteristic of a capitalist society.

[Option ID = 44590]

3. Economic relations are not significant to understanding capitalism as an institutionalised normative order.

[Option ID = 44591]

4. There are different forms taken by capitalism as an institutionalised social order.

[Option ID = 44592]

4) If capitalism is neither an economic system nor a reified form of ethical life, then what is it? My answer is that it is best conceived as an institutionalized social order, on a par with, for example, feudalism. Understanding capitalism in this way underscores its structural divisions, especially the institutional separations that I have identified. Constitutive of capitalism,

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Following from the above passage, which of the following can be seen as intrinsic to capitalism:

[Question ID = 11149]

1. Border controls for financial capital

[Option ID = 44596]

2. Social Welfare Policies

[Option ID = 44593]

3. Deforestation

[Option ID = 44594]

4. Identity politics

[Option ID = 44595]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q21_Q24

1) Unlike the antimarket left (and his Stalinist successors), Marx put money at the center of any complex society, both actual and potential. An apparently neutral instrument of exchange among equals in liberal theory, money also acts as a “fetish,” both hiding and articulating hierarchical relations between the owners of the means of production and the workers they exploited. This insight underpinned a vision of relations and forces of production in history that would soon lead to the whole world being overtaken by capitalist expansion. Marx’s anthropology was largely a retrospective exercise emphasizing how the movement of resistance he and Engels built would become the horizon of all humanity.

In *The Philosophy of Money*, Simmel sought to make sense of money as part of a neo-Kantian project aiming for a society of equal and independent individuals. Money allowed for individual expression of desires and, thus, for the social constitution of autonomous subjects. Yet it worked as a measure of value only because people could count on others to accept it, so money transcended the individual. Simmel identified money’s twin anchors as its physical substance (coins, paper) and the community of its users, which is an invisible third party to all transactions. He predicted that the first would wither away, thereby revealing money’s social character; indeed, it is a symbol of our human capacity to make universal society. As capitalism and colonialism expanded, money would dialectically unite the world through common standards of measure, provoking a general recognition that all participants are intrinsically equal. This in turn would give rise to a more just distribution of money than was possible under capitalism. Simmel, following Hegel, understood the present as a historical moment that would be surpassed by its own teleology.

Weber did not engage with world history as teleology, but his analytical categories closely reproduced the moral vision of neo-Kantianism. For him, the origins of modern capitalism lay in a religious revolution, the Reformation, whose cultural premises had an affinity with the need of business enterprises for rational calculation. He was also aware of the intimate links among bureaucracy, states, and capitalist firms. Yet, whether the discussion was of Chinese peasants or Protestant entrepreneurs, the personality structure of his ideal types does not change over time or between places. A subject always exercises free will in relation to different values through three types of action—habitual, affective, and rational— that limited what Weber’s sociology can account for. Money does not occupy a distinctive position in this sociology; in general, it is a means of exchange that depends on trust between the participants. Thus, Weber’s historical analysis of capitalism does not support a vision of an alternative future for humanity, but rather envisages the tragic repetition of his general types of human action.

Which of these statements are NOT logically implied by the passage?

1. Money enables individual autonomy and promotes social interdependence.
2. The physical forms of money are what enable it to unify global society.
3. Money has led to hierarchical structures of exploitation under capitalism.
4. Money can only promote relations that are rational.

[Question ID = 11150]

1. i only

[Option ID = 44597]

2. i, ii, iii, iv

[Option ID = 44598]

3. iii only

[Option ID = 44599]

4. ii & iv

[Option ID = 44600]

2) Unlike the antimarket left (and his Stalinist successors), Marx put money at the center of any complex society, both actual and potential. An apparently neutral instrument of exchange among equals in liberal theory, money also acts as a “fetish,” both hiding and articulating hierarchical relations between the owners of the means of production and the workers they exploited. This insight underpinned a vision of relations and forces of production in history that would soon lead to the whole world being overtaken by capitalist expansion. Marx’s anthropology was largely a retrospective exercise emphasizing how the movement of resistance he and Engels built would become the horizon of all humanity.

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Which of these statements is best reflected in the authors’ argument?

1. Marx believed that money would no longer be socially important after the overthrow of capitalism.
2. Weber’s analysis of capitalism did not offer a vision of an alternative future for humanity.
3. Simmel considered money to be a persistent source of inequality in social relations.
4. It is only because they are neo-Kantians that Marx, Simmel and Weber recognize the social and theoretical importance of money

[Question ID = 11151]

1. iii & iv

[Option ID = 44601]

2. i only

[Option ID = 44602]

3. ii only

[Option ID = 44603]

4. i, ii, iii & iv

[Option ID = 44604]

3) Unlike the antimarket left (and his Stalinist successors), Marx put money at the center of any complex society, both actual and potential. An apparently neutral instrument of exchange among equals in liberal theory, money also acts as a “fetish,” both hiding and articulating hierarchical relations between the owners of the means of production and the workers they exploited. This insight underpinned a vision of relations and forces of production in history that would soon lead to the whole world being overtaken by capitalist expansion. Marx’s anthropology was largely a retrospective exercise emphasizing how the movement of resistance he and Engels built would become the horizon of all humanity.

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According to the passage, which of the following are valid components of a definition of money?

1. Money is a measure of value transcending the individual.
2. Money both creates and hides hierarchical social relations.
3. Money is a means of exchange that depends on mutual trust.
4. Money defines a community of users

[Question ID = 11152]

1. i only

[Option ID = 44605]

2. iii only

[Option ID = 44606]

3. i, iii & iv

[Option ID = 44607]

4. i, ii, iii & iv

[Option ID = 44608]

4) Unlike the antimarket left (and his Stalinist successors), Marx put money at the center of any complex society, both actual and potential. An apparently neutral instrument of exchange among equals in liberal theory, money also acts as a “fetish,” both hiding and articulating hierarchical relations between the owners of the means of production and the workers they exploited. This insight underpinned a vision of relations and forces of production in history that would soon lead to the whole world being overtaken by capitalist expansion. Marx’s anthropology was largely a retrospective exercise emphasizing how the movement of resistance he and Engels built would become the horizon of all humanity.

In *The Philosophy of Money*, Simmel sought to make sense of money as part of a neo-Kantian project aiming for a society of equal and independent individuals. Money allowed for individual expression of desires and, thus, for the social constitution of autonomous subjects. Yet it worked as a measure of value only because people could count on others to accept it, so money transcended the individual. Simmel identified money’s twin anchors as its physical substance (coins, paper) and the community of its users, which is an invisible third party to all transactions. He predicted that the first would wither away, thereby revealing money’s social character; indeed, it is a symbol of our human capacity to make universal society. As capitalism and colonialism expanded, money would dialectically unite the world through common standards of measure, provoking a general recognition that all participants are intrinsically equal. This in turn would give rise to a more just distribution of money than was possible under capitalism. Simmel, following Hegel, understood the present as a historical moment that would be surpassed by its own teleology.

Weber did not engage with world history as teleology, but his analytical categories closely reproduced the moral vision of neo-Kantianism. For him, the origins of modern capitalism lay in a religious revolution, the Reformation, whose cultural premises had an affinity with the need of business enterprises for rational calculation. He was also aware of the intimate links among bureaucracy, states, and capitalist firms. Yet, whether the discussion was of Chinese peasants or Protestant entrepreneurs, the personality structure of his ideal types does not change over time or between places. A subject always exercises free will in relation to different values through three types of action—habitual, affective, and rational— that limited what Weber’s sociology can account for. Money does not occupy a distinctive position in this sociology; in general, it is a means of exchange that depends on trust between the participants. Thus, Weber’s historical analysis of capitalism does not support a vision of an alternative future for humanity, but rather envisages the tragic repetition of his general types of human action.

According to the passage, what is the position of the human subject with respect to money?

1. The human subject is one who exercises free will.
2. Human subjects are intrinsically unequal with respect to money.
3. The human subject can be free only when money transcends its physical form as coins or paper.
4. The human subject will always be at the center of any society involving money.

[Question ID = 11153]

1. ii & iii

[Option ID = 44609]

2. i & ii

[Option ID = 44610]

3. i & iv

[Option ID = 44611]

4. iii & iv

[Option ID = 44612]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q25_Q28

1) As bad as the climate crisis is, however, it is important to understand that it is *only a part of the larger global ecological crisis*—since climate change is merely one among a number of dangerous rifts in planetary boundaries arising from human transformations of the earth. Ocean acidification, destruction of the ozone layer, species extinction, the disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, growing fresh water shortages, land-cover change, and chemical pollution all represent global ecological transformations/crises. Already we have crossed the planetary boundaries (designated by scientists based on departure from Holocene conditions) not only in relation to climate change, but also with respect to species extinction and the nitrogen cycle....

Faced with such intractable problems, the response of the dominant interests has always been that technology, supplemented by market magic and population control, can solve all problems, allowing for unending capital accumulation and economic growth without undue ecological effects by means of an absolute decoupling of growth from environmental throughput. Thus, when asked about the problems posed by fossil fuels (including tar sands oil, shale oil and gas, and coal) President Obama responded: “[U]ltimately I think this can be solved with technology.”

Yet, the dream that technology alone, considered in some abstract sense, can solve the environmental problem, allowing for unending economic growth without undue ecological effects through an absolute decoupling of one from the other, is quickly fading. Not only are technological solutions limited by the laws of physics, namely the second law of thermodynamics (which tells us, for example, that energy is partially dissipated upon use), but they are also subject to the laws of capitalism itself. Technological change under the present system routinely brings about relative efficiency gains in energy use, reducing the energy and raw material input per unit of output. Yet, this seldom results in absolute decreases in environmental throughput at the aggregate level; rather the tendency is toward the ever-greater use of energy and materials. This is captured by the well-known Jevons paradox, named after the nineteenth-century economist William Stanley Jevons. Jevons pointed out that gains in energy efficiency almost invariably increase the absolute amount of energy used, since such efficiency feeds economic expansion. Jevons highlighted how each new steam engine from Watt’s famous engine on was more efficient in its use of coal than the one before, yet the introduction of each improved steam engine nonetheless resulted in a greater absolute use of coal.

From the passage above, we can infer that:

[Question ID = 11204]

1. President Obama shows a keen understanding of the Jevons paradox.

[Option ID = 44813]

2. The origins of our current planetary emergence can be traced to the nineteenth century.

[Option ID = 44814]

3. The climate crisis is a subset of the ecological crisis.

[Option ID = 44815]

4. Technology is irrelevant to the planetary emergency we are facing.

[Option ID = 44816]

2) As bad as the climate crisis is, however, it is important to understand that it is *only a part of the larger global ecological crisis*—since climate change is merely one among a number of dangerous rifts in planetary boundaries arising from human transformations of the earth. Ocean acidification, destruction of the ozone layer, species extinction, the disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, growing fresh water shortages, land-cover change, and chemical pollution all represent global ecological transformations/crises. Already we have crossed the planetary boundaries (designated by scientists based on departure from Holocene conditions) not only in relation to climate change, but also with respect to species extinction and the nitrogen cycle....

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Based on the above passage, which is the best summing up of the role of technological solutions:

[Question ID = 11205]

1. Contribute to relative efficiency of energy use.

[Option ID = 44817]

2. Increase environmental throughput at the aggregate level.

[Option ID = 44818]

3. Decrease environmental throughput at the aggregate level.

[Option ID = 44819]

4. May increase energy efficiency without reducing overall use of energy and resources.

[Option ID = 44820]

3) As bad as the climate crisis is, however, it is important to understand that it is *only a part of the larger global ecological crisis*—since climate change is merely one among a number of dangerous rifts in planetary boundaries arising from human transformations of the earth. Ocean acidification, destruction of the ozone layer, species extinction, the disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, growing fresh water shortages, land-cover change, and chemical pollution all represent global ecological transformations/crises. Already we have crossed the planetary boundaries (designated by scientists based on departure from Holocene conditions) not only in relation to climate change, but also with respect to species extinction and the nitrogen cycle....

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We can conclude from the above passage that the authors:

[Question ID = 11206]

1. Have little faith in the types of technologies available under capitalism.

[Option ID = 44821]

2. Support the decoupling of environmental problems from economic growth.

[Option ID = 44822]

3. Agree with the dominant interests who want to solve the planetary emergency.

[Option ID = 44823]

4. None of the above.

[Option ID = 44824]

4) As bad as the climate crisis is, however, it is important to understand that it is *only a part of the larger global ecological crisis*—since climate change is merely one among a number of dangerous rifts in planetary boundaries arising from human transformations of the earth. Ocean acidification, destruction of the ozone layer, species extinction, the disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, growing fresh water shortages, land-cover change, and chemical pollution all represent global ecological transformations/crises. Already we have crossed the planetary boundaries (designated by scientists based on departure from Holocene conditions) not only in relation to climate change, but also with respect to species extinction and the nitrogen cycle....

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From the above passage, we know that the Jevons paradox refers to:

[Question ID = 11207]

1. The inverse relationship between energy efficiency and ecological concerns.

[Option ID = 44825]

2. The centrality of the steam engine for early economic growth.

[Option ID = 44826]

3. The inverse relationship between energy efficiency and economic expansion.

[Option ID = 44827]

4. The inverse relationship between gains in energy efficiency and energy consumption.

[Option ID = 44828]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q29_Q32

1) It is easy to agree on the fact that, from a sociological perspective, all identities are constructed. The real issue is how, from what, by whom, and for what. The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations. But individuals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework. I propose, as a hypothesis, that, in general terms, who constructs collective identity, and for what, largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it. Since the social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relationships, I propose a distinction between three forms and origins of identity building:

Legitimizing identity: introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination vis a` vis social actors, a theme that is at the heart of Sennett’s theory of authority and domination, but also fits with various theories of nationalism.

Resistance identity: generated by those actors who are in positions/ conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society, as Calhoun proposes when explaining the emergence of identity politics.

Project identity: when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social structure. This is the case, for instance, when feminism moves out of the trenches of resistance of women’s identity and women’s rights, to challenge patriarchy, thus the patriarchal family, and thus the entire structure of production, reproduction, sexuality, and personality on which societies have been historically based.

Naturally, identities that start as resistance may induce projects, and may also, along the course of history, become dominant in the institutions of society, thus becoming legitimizing identities to rationalize their domination. Indeed, the dynamics of identities along this sequence shows that, from the point of view of social theory, no identity can be an essence, and no identity has, per se, progressive or regressive value outside its historical context. A different, and very important matter, is the benefits of each identity for the people who belong.

According to the above passage, identities are:

[Question ID = 11791]

1. A given fact of social life beyond the control of individual actors.

[Option ID = 47162]

2. Are thoroughly imbued with relations of inequality.

[Option ID = 47163]

3. Are a product of specific social and historical contexts.

[Option ID = 47164]

4. Are extremely fragile.

[Option ID = 47165]

2) It is easy to agree on the fact that, from a sociological perspective, all identities are constructed. The real issue is how, from what, by whom, and for what. The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations. But individuals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework. I propose, as a hypothesis, that, in general terms, who constructs collective identity, and for what, largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it. Since the social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relationships, I propose a distinction between three forms and origins of identity building:

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According to the above passage, identities are generally characterised by:

[Question ID = 11792]

1. Essential attributes.

[Option ID = 47166]

2. Novelty of social concerns.

[Option ID = 47167]

3. Subversive potential.

[Option ID = 47168]

4. Relationships of power.

[Option ID = 47169]

3) It is easy to agree on the fact that, from a sociological perspective, all identities are constructed. The real issue is how, from what, by whom, and for what. The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations. But individuals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework. I propose, as a hypothesis, that, in general terms, who constructs collective identity, and for what, largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it. Since the social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relationships, I propose a distinction between three forms and origins of identity building:

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The passage suggests that gender identity can take the form of:

[Question ID = 11793]

1. Legitimising identity.

[Option ID = 47170]

2. Resistance identity.

[Option ID = 47171]

3. Project identity.

[Option ID = 47172]

4. Any or all of the other three.

[Option ID = 47173]

4) It is easy to agree on the fact that, from a sociological perspective, all identities are constructed. The real issue is how, from what, by whom, and for what. The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations. But individuals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework. I propose, as a hypothesis, that, in general terms, who constructs collective identity, and for what, largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it. Since the social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relationships, I propose a distinction between three forms and origins of identity building:

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Resistance identities, as defined in the passage, are unlikely to be based on:

[Question ID = 11794]

1. Dominant social values

[Option ID = 47174]

2. Nationality

[Option ID = 47175]

3. Class

[Option ID = 47176]

4. Sexuality

[Option ID = 47177]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q33_Q34

1) The intellectual issues, therefore, cannot be divorced from the political in doing sociology of gender. With the emergence of second wave feminism and the slogan of 'personal is political', feminist social scientists began to underline the gaps between their experiences as women and their sociological knowledge. Sociologists and their professional bodies were indicted for being androcentric and the hegemony of patriarchy in sociology was elucidated. Bernard (1973) in the now classical essay on the history of the American Sociological Association outlined the feminist challenge to sociology as the fourth revolution in the discipline. The validity of the challenge, she argued, would rest on the reactions of the sociologists to the feminist challenge...Rossi (1964) underlined the significance of the social character of the differences between the sexes over the physiological differences...she outlined the penetration and persistence of the feminine mystique and the

maternal myth in the academy and the labour market. Institutional change in matters of childcare, education and residence were marked as a prerequisite for the goal of equality (ibid.).

The passage implies that:

- i) Equality between men and women cannot be achieved without changing the way childcare and education are organised.
- ii) In subjects other than the sociology of gender, intellectual issues can be separated from political issues.
- iii) It is not sociologists themselves but their professional bodies that were responsible for the subordination of women in the discipline.

Which of the above statements are true:

[Question ID = 11208]

1. All (i, ii, and iii)

[Option ID = 44829]

2. None (Neither i, nor ii nor iii)

[Option ID = 44830]

3. i only

[Option ID = 44831]

4. i and iii

[Option ID = 44832]

2) The intellectual issues, therefore, cannot be divorced from the political in doing sociology of gender. With the emergence of second wave feminism and the slogan of 'personal is political', feminist social scientists began to underline the gaps between their experiences as women and their sociological knowledge. Sociologists and their professional bodies were indicted for being androcentric and the hegemony of patriarchy in sociology was elucidated. Bernard (1973) in the now classical essay on the history of the American Sociological Association outlined the feminist challenge to sociology as the fourth revolution in the discipline. The validity of the challenge, she argued, would rest on the reactions of the sociologists to the feminist challenge...Rossi (1964) underlined the significance of the social character of the differences between the sexes over the physiological differences...she outlined the penetration and persistence of the feminine mystique and the maternal myth in the academy and the labour market. Institutional change in matters of childcare, education and residence were marked as a prerequisite for the goal of equality (ibid.).

According to the passage, which of these statements are false?

- i) Rossi argues that biological differences between men and women were fewer than the social differences.
- ii) Bernard argues that classical sociology was patriarchal and hostile towards women.
- iii) Rege argues that before the second wave of feminism, there was little difference between female scholars' life experiences and their professional knowledge.

[Question ID = 11209]

1. All (i, ii, and iii)

[Option ID = 44833]

2. None (Neither i, nor ii nor iii)

[Option ID = 44834]

3. ii only

[Option ID = 44835]

4. i and iii

[Option ID = 44836]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q35_Q36

1) *Santaner Caritra Gathan* is a pedagogy on the formation of the "character" of children. This was an important part of the new normative discourse on the family that was produced in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Bengal. This discourse conceived the "isolation" of the family not only from the kinship system but also from the world of work. The conception of the family as an "isolated" private domain, as a refuge from a competitive and brutal outside world, was one that was shared by most writers. The family, with its hierarchy, spatial arrangement, and disciplinary mechanism, constituted in this discourse one way of distributing powers and pleasures. The discourse generated a radical separation between work and leisure, public life and private life, childhood and adulthood.

In this private world, husband and wife were to find solace and spiritual renewal in each other's company. The woman in particular would serve, in the favourite phrase of our authors, as one who would provide comfort, succour, and support. The child occupied centre stage in this discourse; indeed, a new idea of childhood helped precipitate the new discourse on the family. The child came to be regarded as a person with distinctive attributes—impressionability, vulnerability, innocence—that required a "correct," protected, and prolonged period of nurture. It was only through a certain practice and

strategy that the child's character-building exercise was to be pursued. In this process, the child was required to be segregated from premature contact with various corrupting influences and subjugated to a regime of love, affection, discipline, and punishment. Only this, it was asserted, would help the gradual and gentle unfolding of his nature (the *his* is used advisedly, because, as we will see below, this is a discourse almost exclusively about the male child). In a sense, this discourse implied more intense emotional ties between parents and children within the family and a weakening of ties with relatives outside the immediate family.

In this essay on the early popular literature in Bengali on child rearing and the family, the author is suggesting that the emerging new discourse on the family sought to distance it from:

[Question ID = 11210]

1. Power and pleasure
[Option ID = 44837]
2. Hierarchy and discipline
[Option ID = 44838]
3. Competition and kin networks
[Option ID = 44839]
4. Leisure and privacy
[Option ID = 44840]

2) *Santaner Caritra Gathan* is a pedagogy on the formation of the "character" of children. This was an important part of the new normative discourse on the family that was produced in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Bengal. This discourse conceived the "isolation" of the family not only from the kinship system but also from the world of work. The conception of the family as an "isolated" private domain, as a refuge from a competitive and brutal outside world, was one that was shared by most writers. The family, with its hierarchy, spatial arrangement, and disciplinary mechanism, constituted in this discourse one way of distributing powers and pleasures. The discourse generated a radical separation between work and leisure, public life and private life, childhood and adulthood.

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According to the passage, the early popular literature on child rearing had the following qualities:

- i) it ignored family members other than parents and their children;
- ii) it believed that the child must be given love and affection;
- iii) it believed that children must be disciplined and punished;
- iv) it believed that girls and boys should be treated equally.

Which of the above options are correct:

[Question ID = 11211]

1. All (iv, iii, ii and i)
[Option ID = 44841]
2. ii and i only
[Option ID = 44842]
3. iii and iv
[Option ID = 44843]
4. iii, ii and i
[Option ID = 44844]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q37_Q38

1) For many decades sociology was criticized for having departed from the historical concerns of its nineteenth century founders. This departure was characterized by a shift from a macroscopic to a more microscopic focus on society, from studies of social change and aspects of total societies, viewed in a historical and comparative perspective, to the study of inter-personal relations, the structure of small groups, and the analysis of the decision-making process, accompanied by an emphasis on improving the quantitative methodology appropriate to these topics. This change suggested to its critics that

modern sociology had lost contact with its original intellectual traditions. The writings of men like Max Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville, Robert Michels, and Vilfredo Pareto were apparently of contemporary interest only insofar as they had attempted to specify formal functional relationships and social psychological processes of the type that interested latter-day sociologists.

In the last decade, however, the situation has changed again. In American sociology, once viewed by many European scholars as ahistorical and concerned only with problems for which advanced statistical techniques are appropriate, there has been a significant revival of historical and comparative sociology. At a number of major sociology departments, a sizable number of recent tenure appointees are involved in the analysis of social change and with historical and comparative sociology, while a number of important older scholars have turned or returned to the analysis of total societies viewed in a comparative context, or to historical work. This revival has taken many forms, including interest in the sociology of science, concern with the determinants of change in intellectual life, interest in the evolution of national values, and many others. The growth of interest in such problems is so recent that many with an interest in sociology, including some in the profession itself, are unaware of the extent to which leading sociologists and departments have become involved in these fields of inquiry.

Perhaps the most significant source of renewed interest in historical and comparative sociology has been the emergence of a body of inquiry which, lacking a better label, has been called the sociology of development. This term refers to interest in the processes that affect changes within total societies and nations. As a field of research, it parallels the work of economists on problems of economic development. And just as economists concerned with economic development have recognized that much of what is conventionally termed economic history is actually the study of economic development, and that generalizations concerning economic development which are relevant to contemporary “developing economies” can be tested by reference to the past history of developed economies, so sociologists interested in problems of societal modernization and nation building in Africa and Asia have come to recognize that the “old states” of the world have much to tell us about these processes. In sociology as in economics, interest in comparative development has involved a renewed concern with historical analysis.

According to this passage, in the ten years prior to its publication (in 1964), the changes that have taken place in American sociology include:

- i) Distancing from its historical roots and original concerns.
- ii) A return to the issues of problems addressed by its founders.
- iii) A shift from studying society-wide phenomena to researching localized issues.
- iv) A renewed interest in historical and comparative work.

Which of the above options are true?

[Question ID = 11212]

1. i and iii

[Option ID = 44845]

2. ii and iii

[Option ID = 44846]

3. ii, iii and iv

[Option ID = 44847]

4. ii and iv

[Option ID = 44848]

2) For many decades sociology was criticized for having departed from the historical concerns of its nineteenth century founders. This departure was characterized by a shift from a macroscopic to a more microscopic focus on society, from studies of social change and aspects of total societies, viewed in a historical and comparative perspective, to the study of inter-personal relations, the structure of small groups, and the analysis of the decision-making process, accompanied by an emphasis on improving the quantitative methodology appropriate to these topics. This change suggested to its critics that modern sociology had lost contact with its original intellectual traditions. The writings of men like Max Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville, Robert Michels, and Vilfredo Pareto were apparently of contemporary interest only insofar as they had attempted to specify formal functional relationships and social psychological processes of the type that interested latter-day sociologists.

In the last decade, however, the situation has changed again. In American sociology, once viewed by many European scholars as ahistorical and concerned only with problems for which advanced statistical techniques are appropriate, there has been a significant revival of historical and comparative sociology. At a number of major sociology departments, a sizable number of recent tenure appointees are involved in the analysis of social change and with historical and comparative sociology, while a number of important older scholars have turned or returned to the analysis of total societies viewed in a comparative context, or to historical work. This revival has taken many forms, including interest in the sociology of science, concern with the determinants of change in intellectual life, interest in the evolution of national values, and many others. The growth of interest in such problems is so recent that many with an interest in sociology, including some in the profession itself, are unaware of the extent to which leading sociologists and departments have become involved in these fields of inquiry.

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the processes that affect changes within total societies and nations. As a field of research, it parallels the work of economists on problems of economic development. And just as economists concerned with economic development have recognized that much of what is conventionally termed economic history is actually the study of economic development, and that generalizations concerning economic development which are relevant to contemporary “developing economies” can be tested by reference to the past history of developed economies, so sociologists interested in problems of societal modernization and nation building in Africa and Asia have come to recognize that the “old states” of the world have much to tell us about these processes. In sociology as in economics, interest in comparative development has involved a renewed concern with historical analysis.

The most important reason why the author of this passage is highlighting the sociology of development is because:

[Question ID = 11213]

1. It is an example of comparative and historical work.

[Option ID = 44849]

2. It is focussing on the economy, a neglected subject in sociology.

[Option ID = 44850]

3. It is a way of understanding social change in Asia and Africa.

[Option ID = 44851]

4. The past of the west can be used as a guide to study the present of the non-west.

[Option ID = 44852]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q39_Q40

1) The Chinese used a ball made of leather and filled with hemp. In the time of the Pharaohs the Egyptians used a ball made of straw or the husks of seeds, wrapped in colourful fabric. The Greeks and Romans used an ox bladder, inflated and sewn shut. Europeans of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance played with an oval-shaped ball filled with horsehair. In America the ball was made of rubber and bounced like nowhere else. The chroniclers of the Spanish Court tell how Hernán Cortés bounced a Mexican ball high in the air before the bulging eyes of Emperor Charles.

The rubber chamber, swollen with air and covered with leather, was born in the middle of the nineteenth century thanks to the genius of Charles Goodyear, an American from Connecticut. And long after that, thanks to the genius of Tossolini, Valbonesi and Polo, three Argentines from Córdoba, the lace-free ball was born. They invented a chamber with a valve inflated by injection, and ever since the 1938 World Cup it has been possible to head the ball without getting hurt by the laces that once tied it together.

Until the middle of the twentieth century, the ball was brown. Then white. In our days it comes in different patterns of black on a white background. Now it has a waist of sixty centimetres and is dressed in polyurethane on polyethylene foam. Waterproof, it weighs less than a pound and travels more quickly than the old leather ball, which on rainy days barely moved.

They call it by many names: the sphere, the round, the tool, the globe, the balloon, the projectile. In Brazil no one doubts the ball is a woman. Brazilians call her pudgy, *gorduchinha*, or baby, *menina*, and they give her names like Maricota, Leonor or Margarita.

Pelé kissed her in Maracanã when he scored his thousandth goal and Di Stéfano built her a monument in front of his house, a bronze ball with a plaque that says: *Thanks, old girl*.

She is loyal. In the final match of the 1930 World Cup, both teams insisted on playing with their own ball. Sage as Solomon, the referee decided that the first half would be played with the Argentine ball and the second with the Uruguayan ball. Argentina won the first half, and Uruguay the second. The ball can also be fickle, refusing to enter the goal because she changes her mind in mid-flight and curls away. You see, she is easily offended. She cannot stand getting kicked or hit out of spite. She insists on being caressed, kissed, lulled to sleep on the chest or the foot. She is proud, vain perhaps, and it is easy to understand why: she knows all too well that when she rises gracefully she brings joy to many a heart, and many a heart is crushed when she lands badly.

In this passage, the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano offers a short history of the modern ball with which the game of football is played. Which of the following facts about the ball are true:

- i. Footballs have always been made of air-filled materials.
- ii. Footballs have always been round or spherical in shape.
- iii. The football is often treated as though it were a person.
- iv. As a person the football is always loyal and faithful.

[Question ID = 11214]

1. None

[Option ID = 44853]

2. i, ii and iii

[Option ID = 44854]

3. iii only

[Option ID = 44855]

4. All

2) The Chinese used a ball made of leather and filled with hemp. In the time of the Pharaohs the Egyptians used a ball made of straw or the husks of seeds, wrapped in colourful fabric. The Greeks and Romans used an ox bladder, inflated and sewn shut. Europeans of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance played with an oval-shaped ball filled with horsehair. In America the ball was made of rubber and bounced like nowhere else. The chroniclers of the Spanish Court tell how Hernán Cortés bounced a Mexican ball high in the air before the bulging eyes of Emperor Charles.

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The specific example of the “loyalty” of the football cited in the passage refers to:

[Question ID = 11215]

1. The monument built by Alfredo Di Stefano

[Option ID = 44857]

2. The final of the 1930 World Cup

[Option ID = 44858]

3. Pelé’s thousandth goal

[Option ID = 44859]

4. The innovation of Tossolini, Valbonesi and Polo

[Option ID = 44860]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q41_Q42

1) ‘Indian civilization’ is a romantic idea. It is as political as it is ahistorical, as contentious as it is patronizing. But the idea itself has a history rooted in nineteenth-century Orientalist perceptions of India. And there are as many ways of defining ‘Indian civilization’ as there are people defining it. It should then serve us well to speak, in more humble terms, of the ideas of India that inform or animate popular imagination and learned judgements rather than imagine into existence an essentialist entity like ‘Indian civilization’. The making of these ideas has had a long history that has only now, under the weight of late capitalism, ceased to evolve and begun to freeze into an alienated spectacle. Popular imagination and the prevailing wisdom in Indic studies generally trace the beginnings of this history to the second millennium BCE or the age of the Vēdas. We must acknowledge that this position, for all that it is worth, should be approached with scepticism. We cannot also maintain the view from the other end of the scholarly spectrum, once presented by Orientalist Indology and now reflected in some versions of postcolonial studies, that Indian history and the ideas of India did not exist before the colonial era and that they took shape on the great *tabula rasa* of the Orient that colonial forms of knowledge dreamt into life in the nineteenth century. The following pages will testify to the fact that the foundations for the ideas of India were laid in the early medieval period. India had its beginnings in the early medieval centuries, and inasmuch as a beginning is a *beginning* and cannot in this respect be *early medieval*, we must begin to reconsider in all earnest the existing scheme of periodization in Indian history.

In this passage, the Indian historian Manu Devadevan is arguing that:

- i. The idea of ‘Indian civilization’ is political, patronizing and contentious.
- ii. The idea of ‘Indian civilization’ has no history.

iii. The idea of ‘Indian civilization’ is a popular and not a scholarly idea.

iv. The idea of ‘Indian civilization’ is worthless and should be abandoned.

Which of the above correctly represents the argument of the passage?

[Question ID = 11216]

1. All (iv, iii, ii and i)

[Option ID = 44861]

2. i and ii

[Option ID = 44862]

3. i only

[Option ID = 44863]

4. None

[Option ID = 44864]

2) ‘Indian civilization’ is a romantic idea. It is as political as it is ahistorical, as contentious as it is patronizing. But the idea itself has a history rooted in nineteenth-century Orientalist perceptions of India. And there are as many ways of defining ‘Indian civilization’ as there are people defining it. It should then serve us well to speak, in more humble terms, of the ideas of India that inform or animate popular imagination and learned judgements rather than imagine into existence an essentialist entity like ‘Indian civilization’. The making of these ideas has had a long history that has only now, under the weight of late capitalism, ceased to evolve and begun to freeze into an alienated spectacle. Popular imagination and the prevailing wisdom in Indic studies generally trace the beginnings of this history to the second millennium BCE or the age of the Vēdas. We must acknowledge that this position, for all that it is worth, should be approached with scepticism. We cannot also maintain the view from the other end of the scholarly spectrum, once presented by Orientalist Indology and now reflected in some versions of postcolonial studies, that Indian history and the ideas of India did not exist before the colonial era and that they took shape on the great *tabula rasa* of the Orient that colonial forms of knowledge dreamt into life in the nineteenth century. The following pages will testify to the fact that the foundations for the ideas of India were laid in the early medieval period. India had its beginnings in the early medieval centuries, and inasmuch as a beginning is a *beginning* and cannot in this respect be *early medieval*, we must begin to reconsider in all earnest the existing scheme of periodization in Indian history.

In this passage, which of the following claims does the author argue AGAINST:

i. The popular view that the idea of India can be traced back to the age of the Vedas in the second millennium BCE.

ii. The postcolonial studies perspective that the idea of India is a colonial invention and did not exist before the colonial period.

iii. The claim that scholarly views of the origins of the idea of India must be valued above popular ideas about the same.

iv. The claim that an essentialist notion of “Indian civilization” is superior to broader conceptions of the India.

[Question ID = 11217]

1. iii, ii and i

[Option ID = 44865]

2. ii and iii

[Option ID = 44866]

3. i only

[Option ID = 44867]

4. All (iv, iii, ii and i)

[Option ID = 44868]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q43_Q46

1) [T]he early anthropologists, who happened to be Europeans with a Western habit of dividing humanity into ‘us’ and ‘them’, of separating ‘ourselves’ from ‘themselves’, and of ranking the familiar higher than the unfamiliar, extended this habit of mind into their scientific activities which, by the very nature of science, should have been *objective*. However, as E. E. Evans Pritchard, one of the foremost anthropologists of all times, himself put it, “to investigate in particular societies, the nature of religion, ethics, law, and modes of thought and the basic functions of the family and of economic and political institutions”, the anthropologist as a sociologist of the non-European society, is in fact studying “subjects of general interest and problems which are found in all societies”, including his own. It is in this sense that the concept of African sociology, or the sociology of African societies, is an element in what Christopher G. A. Bryant, following T. S. Kuhn, recently called the “disciplinary matrix of concepts, assumptions, basic laws, proven methods and other objects of commitment common to all practitioners of a specified disciplines...”. It is in the same sense too, that the European sociologist of African society is, intellectually, the predecessor of the contemporary African who has been trained as a sociologist in European or American institutions of learning and who now makes African societies his objects of study.

There are, however, in African universities today a few well-placed anthropologists who still perceive and study African societies from the traditional vantage point. To these their job is one perpetual fieldwork with periods of residence among

'the natives' being studied. In a few instances fieldwork spreads over a decade or more. Rather than accepting the transnational character of sociology today, these anthropologists divide human intellectual products into dichotomous sets; on the one hand traditional or primitive thought, belief systems, native cosmologies and non-philosophical thought processes, on the other, classical thought, theoretical orientations to society, and philosophical systems. They continue to see in the non-western societies where they work, evidences of a lack of "critical discernment of fact from fiction", even though they admit of the existence of "other ways of thinking" than their own. Because of this, in part, there is an absence of African paradigms of sociology which are free from the distortions of subjective labelling, in our scientific endeavour to account for social phenomena. Another factor which inevitably hinders the emergence of better paradigms of society in Africa is the complete dependence of sociologists in general upon the conceptual categories developed to explain European and American experiences of social life. These are then treated as universal tools for cognition and explanation of social life in various African societies. This dependence will continue until the futility of this method of knowing, understanding, and explaining social phenomena inevitably forces sociologists of African life to discover conceptual categories that are born of the dynamic social processes taking place in various parts of Africa.

According to the passage, the early anthropologists failed to be objective because:

[Question ID = 11218]

1. They were Europeans

[Option ID = 44869]

2. They were not trained scientists

[Option ID = 44870]

3. They valued the familiar more than the unfamiliar

[Option ID = 44871]

4. They had Western habits

[Option ID = 44872]

2) [T]he early anthropologists, who happened to be Europeans with a Western habit of dividing humanity into 'us' and 'them', of separating 'ourselves' from 'themselves', and of ranking the familiar higher than the unfamiliar, extended this habit of mind into their scientific activities which, by the very nature of science, should have been *objective*. However, as E. E. Evans Pritchard, one of the foremost anthropologists of all times, himself put it, "to investigate in particular societies, the nature of religion, ethics, law, and modes of thought and the basic functions of the family and of economic and political institutions", the anthropologist as a sociologist of the non-European society, is in fact studying "subjects of general interest and problems which are found in all societies", including his own. It is in this sense that the concept of African sociology, or the sociology of African societies, is an element in what Christopher G. A. Bryant, following T. S. Kuhn, recently called the "disciplinary matrix of concepts, assumptions, basic laws, proven methods and other objects of commitment common to all practitioners of a specified disciplines...". It is in the same sense too, that the European sociologist of African society is, intellectually, the predecessor of the contemporary African who has been trained as a sociologist in European or American institutions of learning and who now makes African societies his objects of study.

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According to Akinsola Akiwowo, European sociologists of African society are the intellectual ancestors of contemporary African sociologists studying African society because:

[Question ID = 11219]

1. Both study the same subject, namely African society

[Option ID = 44873]

2. Both are trained in western institutions that study non-western societies

[Option ID = 44874]

3. Both are required to live and do fieldwork in African countries

[Option ID = 44875]

4. Both are trained to study phenomena found in all societies

[Option ID = 44876]

3) [T]he early anthropologists, who happened to be Europeans with a Western habit of dividing humanity into 'us' and 'them', of separating 'ourselves' from 'themselves', and of ranking the familiar higher than the unfamiliar, extended this habit of mind into their scientific activities which, by the very nature of science, should have been *objective*. However, as E. E. Evans Pritchard, one of the foremost anthropologists of all times, himself put it, "to investigate in particular societies, the nature of religion, ethics, law, and modes of thought and the basic functions of the family and of economic and political institutions", the anthropologist as a sociologist of the non-European society, is in fact studying "subjects of general interest and problems which are found in all societies", including his own. It is in this sense that the concept of African sociology, or the sociology of African societies, is an element in what Christopher G. A. Bryant, following T. S. Kuhn, recently called the "disciplinary matrix of concepts, assumptions, basic laws, proven methods and other objects of commitment common to all practitioners of a specified disciplines...". It is in the same sense too, that the European sociologist of African society is, intellectually, the predecessor of the contemporary African who has been trained as a sociologist in European or American institutions of learning and who now makes African societies his objects of study.

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In this passage, the Nigerian sociologist Akinsola Akiwowo is criticising some African sociologists for:

[Question ID = 11220]

1. Working with conceptual dichotomies that produce subjective distortions

[Option ID = 44877]

2. Doing long periods of fieldwork that stretch beyond a decade

[Option ID = 44878]

3. Not respecting African traditions and culture

[Option ID = 44879]

4. Lacking a theoretical orientation to society

[Option ID = 44880]

4) [T]he early anthropologists, who happened to be Europeans with a Western habit of dividing humanity into 'us' and 'them', of separating 'ourselves' from 'themselves', and of ranking the familiar higher than the unfamiliar, extended this habit of mind into their scientific activities which, by the very nature of science, should have been *objective*. However, as E. E. Evans Pritchard, one of the foremost anthropologists of all times, himself put it, "to investigate in particular societies, the nature of religion, ethics, law, and modes of thought and the basic functions of the family and of economic and political institutions", the anthropologist as a sociologist of the non-European society, is in fact studying "subjects of general interest and problems which are found in all societies", including his own. It is in this sense that the concept of African sociology, or the sociology of African societies, is an element in what Christopher G. A. Bryant, following T. S. Kuhn, recently called the "disciplinary matrix of concepts, assumptions, basic laws, proven methods and other objects of commitment common to all practitioners of a specified disciplines...". It is in the same sense too, that the European sociologist of African society is, intellectually, the predecessor of the contemporary African who has been trained as a sociologist in European or American institutions of learning and who now makes African societies his objects of study.

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explaining social phenomena inevitably forces sociologists of African life to discover conceptual categories that are born of the dynamic social processes taking place in various parts of Africa.

In this passage, Akinsola Akiwowo is advocating for the development of African conceptual categories because:

- i) They are better than American or European concepts
- ii) They emerge from the same social processes they try to explain
- iii) Social phenomena are never the same in different societies
- iv) In reality, social science disciplines are national rather than transnational

Which of the above statements best reflect the views of the author?

[Question ID = 11221]

1. All (i, ii, iii and iv)
[Option ID = 44881]

2. ii only
[Option ID = 44882]

3. iv only
[Option ID = 44883]

4. iii and iv
[Option ID = 44884]

Topic:- SOCIO_Q47_Q50

1)

Table 1: INDICATORS ON ‘WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT’, NFHS-V, 2019-20.

By sector, with total from NFHS-IV 2015-16 for comparison.

Five Indicators of Women’s Empowerment (Age group 15-49 years)						
State	Sector/Year	Household decision making (%)	Paid employment (%)	Ownership of property (%)	Own bank account (%)	Own mobile phone (%)
BIHAR	Urban	84.0	11.7	53.4	79.1	61.8
	Rural	87.0	12.8	55.7	76.2	49.3
	Total 2019-20	86.5	12.6	55.3	76.7	51.4
	Total 2015-16	75.2	12.5	58.8	26.4	40.9
GUJARAT	Urban	94.4	26.4	41.6	73.5	66.0
	Rural	90.7	34.1	43.3	67.5	36.2
	Total 2019-20	92.2	30.8	42.6	70.0	48.8
	Total 2015-16	85.4	30.2	27.2	48.6	47.9
KERALA	Urban	93.6	25.8	25.3	78.9	86.2
	Rural	94.6	25.8	29.2	78.2	86.9
	Total 2019-20	94.1	25.8	27.3	78.5	86.6
	Total 2015-16	92.1	20.4	34.9	70.6	81.2
MEGHALAYA	Urban	93.3	43.1	47.8	78.0	78.2
	Rural	92.0	39.1	70.1	68.2	64.3
	Total 2019-20	92.3	40.0	65.0	70.4	67.5
	Total 2015-16	91.4	35.9	57.3	54.4	64.3

Across states, which indicator shows the highest proportionate change from 2015-16 to 2019-20?

[Question ID = 11222]

1. Participation in household decisions

[Option ID = 44885]

2. Having paid employment

[Option ID = 44886]

3. Owning property

[Option ID = 44887]

4. Having a bank account

[Option ID = 44888]

2) Table 1: INDICATORS ON 'WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT', NFHS-V, 2019-20.

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	Total 2015-16	75.2	12.5	58.8	26.4	40.9
	Urban	94.4	26.4	41.6	73.5	66.0
GUJARAT	Rural	90.7	34.1	43.3	67.5	36.2
	Total 2019-20	92.2	30.8	42.6	70.0	48.8
	Total 2015-16	85.4	30.2	27.2	48.6	47.9
	Urban	93.6	25.8	25.3	78.9	86.2
	Rural	94.6	25.8	29.2	78.2	86.9
KERALA	Total 2019-20	94.1	25.8	27.3	78.5	86.6
	Total 2015-16	92.1	20.4	34.9	70.6	81.2
	Urban	93.3	43.1	47.8	78.0	78.2
	Rural	92.0	39.1	70.1	68.2	64.3
	Total 2019-20	92.3	40.0	65.0	70.4	67.5
MEGHALAYA	Total 2015-16	91.4	35.9	57.3	54.4	64.3

Which sector of which state has the second-highest proportion of women who do not have their own bank account?

[Question ID = 11223]

1. Urban Bihar

[Option ID = 44889]

2. Rural Kerala

[Option ID = 44890]

3. Rural Meghalaya

[Option ID = 44891]

4. Rural Gujarat

3)

Table 1: INDICATORS ON 'WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT', NFHS-V, 2019-20.

By sector, with total from NFHS-IV 2015-16 for comparison.

State	Sector/Year	Five Indicators of Women's Empowerment(Age group 15-49 years)				
		Household decision making (%)	Paid employment (%)	Ownership of property (%)	Own bank account (%)	Own mobile phone (%)
BIHAR	Urban	84.0	11.7	53.4	79.1	61.8
	Rural	87.0	12.8	55.7	76.2	49.3
	Total 2019-20	86.5	12.6	55.3	76.7	51.4
	Total 2015-16	75.2	12.5	58.8	26.4	40.9
GUJARAT	Urban	94.4	26.4	41.6	73.5	66.0
	Rural	90.7	34.1	43.3	67.5	36.2
	Total 2019-20	92.2	30.8	42.6	70.0	48.8
	Total 2015-16	85.4	30.2	27.2	48.6	47.9
KERALA	Urban	93.6	25.8	25.3	78.9	86.2
	Rural	94.6	25.8	29.2	78.2	86.9
	Total 2019-20	94.1	25.8	27.3	78.5	86.6
	Total 2015-16	92.1	20.4	34.9	70.6	81.2
MEGHALAYA	Urban	93.3	43.1	47.8	78.0	78.2
	Rural	92.0	39.1	70.1	68.2	64.3
	Total 2019-20	92.3	40.0	65.0	70.4	67.5
	Total 2015-16	91.4	35.9	57.3	54.4	64.3

The smallest urban-rural difference is for which indicator in which state?

[Question ID = 11224]

1. Having paid employment in Bihar

[Option ID = 44893]

2. Having paid employment in Kerala

[Option ID = 44894]

3. Participating in household decisions in Meghalaya

[Option ID = 44895]

4. Having a bank account in Kerala

[Option ID = 44896]

4)

Table 1: INDICATORS ON 'WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT', NFHS-V, 2019-20.

By sector, with total from NFHS-IV 2015-16 for comparison.

Five Indicators of Women's Empowerment(Age group 15-49 years)

State	Sector/Year	Household decision making (%)	Paid employment (%)	Ownership of property (%)	Own bank account (%)	Own mobile phone (%)
BIHAR	Urban	84.0	11.7	53.4	79.1	61.8
	Rural	87.0	12.8	55.7	76.2	49.3
	Total 2019-20	86.5	12.6	55.3	76.7	51.4
	<i>Total 2015-16</i>	<i>75.2</i>	<i>12.5</i>	<i>58.8</i>	<i>26.4</i>	<i>40.9</i>
	Urban	94.4	26.4	41.6	73.5	66.0
GUJARAT	Rural	90.7	34.1	43.3	67.5	36.2
	Total 2019-20	92.2	30.8	42.6	70.0	48.8
	<i>Total 2015-16</i>	<i>85.4</i>	<i>30.2</i>	<i>27.2</i>	<i>48.6</i>	<i>47.9</i>
	Urban	93.6	25.8	25.3	78.9	86.2
	Rural	94.6	25.8	29.2	78.2	86.9
KERALA	Total 2019-20	94.1	25.8	27.3	78.5	86.6
	<i>Total 2015-16</i>	<i>92.1</i>	<i>20.4</i>	<i>34.9</i>	<i>70.6</i>	<i>81.2</i>
	Urban	93.3	43.1	47.8	78.0	78.2
	Rural	92.0	39.1	70.1	68.2	64.3
	Total 2019-20	92.3	40.0	65.0	70.4	67.5
MEGHALAYA	<i>Total 2015-16</i>	<i>91.4</i>	<i>35.9</i>	<i>57.3</i>	<i>54.4</i>	<i>64.3</i>

Consider the following statements based on Table 1 carefully before you answer this question.

- i) Every indicator in every state shows an increase from 2015-16 to 2019-20.
- ii) In every state except Kerala, the indicator with the second highest value in both urban and rural sectors is own bank account.
- iii) Compared to urban women, a larger proportion of rural women had paid employment in all four states.

Which of the above statements are true?

[Question ID = 11225]

1. i, ii and iii

[Option ID = 44897]

2. ii and iii only

[Option ID = 44898]

3. i and ii only

[Option ID = 44899]

4. None (neither i, nor ii, nor iii)

[Option ID = 44900]